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Rethinking the Process of Political 
Reform in Hong Kong
❒
Simon NM Young*
In a historic vote on 18 June 2015, the Hong Kong government failed 
to obtain the support of two-thirds of all 70 Legislative Council (LegCo) 
members for its proposal on universal suffrage of the chief executive.1 
Had the proposal been passed, the chief executive would have been 
elected by up to five million eligible voters in 2017. Ironically, all 
27 pan-democrat legislators voted against the proposal, as was expected 
for many months. They objected to the restrictions imposed by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) 
in its 31 August 2014 decision.2 In their view, the restrictions were 
incompatible with genuine universal suffrage because they effectively 
enabled the central government to choose two to three chief executive 
candidates. In an unexpected blunder, only eight pro-establishment 
legislators remained in the chamber to vote in favour of the proposal; the 
other 31 left at the last minute hoping to trigger a delay to buy time for 
a fellow legislator (Mr Lau Wong-fat), who was stuck in traffic, to arrive 
and cast his vote. Unfortunately, the plan was not communicated well 
to those who remained in the chamber. Four days after the reform vote, 
pan-democratic legislator, Mr Ronny Tong, announced his resignation 
from both the Civic Party and LegCo in order to start a middle of the 
road think tank known as “Path of Democracy”.3
A process of reform, which began in December 2013, ended in great 
disappointment for everyone. With the reform proposal rejected, the chief 
executive will continue to be nominated and selected by a 1200-person 
* Professor and Associate Dean (Research), Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. This article 
is based on a presentation delivered on 14 May 2015 at the “Occupy Central for Universal 
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1 “Hong Kong reform package rejected as pro-Beijing camp walk out in ‘miscommunication’” 
South China Morning Post (18 June 2015).
2 Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on “Issues Relating 
to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by 
Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region” in the Year 2016, adopted 10th Session, 12th National People’s 
Congress, 31 August 2014.
3 Jeffie Lam and Gary Cheung, “Tong’s resignation widens pan-dem rift” South China Morning Post 
(23 June 2015).
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election committee, at least until 2022, and the earliest possible year 
for realising full universal suffrage of the legislature will be 2024, if not 
2028.4 Many reasons have been given for why the reform efforts failed, 
eg the lack of mutual trust between the pan-democrat legislators and the 
central government, the hard-line approach adopted by the central and 
Hong Kong governments allowing for no compromise or negotiations, 
the 79-day Occupy Central protests and perceived interference by foreign 
governments strengthening Beijing’s resolve to adopt a conservative 
approach to protect national interests, the uncompromising principled 
position of the pan-democrat legislators, the central government’s 
indifference to Hong Kong universal suffrage despite outward appearances 
to the contrary and so on.
Little attention, however, has been paid to how the process of reform 
may have contributed to the demise of the reform enterprise itself.5 No 
public consultation on the process preceded the public consultation 
on substantive reform proposals in late 2013. Indeed, surprisingly few 
questioned the process adopted by the government. It is argued here 
that the nature and significance of the reform exercise deserved a more 
participatory process than the one adopted, ie one that involved more 
meaningful contributions from the public at important moments in the 
process.6 The quality of a participatory process should not be measured 
solely by the numbers of meetings held with or submissions received 
from members of the public. Receiving meaningful contributions at 
important moments means that the public is consulted not only initially 
on reform issues but also on draft reform proposals before they are 
finalised. It also means that the relevant reform bodies should include 
membership from independent individuals, whether as experts or 
representatives of the public. The Hong Kong government should also 
have consulted and secured agreement with legislators on the process 
of reform before commencing the reform exercise. If the stakeholders 
agreed at the outset that the process to be followed would be fair and 
4 A chief executive elected by universal suffrage in 2022 may not have enough time to consult the 
public, reach a consensus on LegCo universal suffrage and pass implementing legislation before 
the September 2024 LegCo election.
5 For one of the few critiques, see Cliff Buddle, “Block of Hong Kong political reform plan only a 
temporary setback on road to universal suffrage” South China Morning Post (19 June 2015).
6 On the importance of participatory processes for constitutional change, see Michele Brandt, 
Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai and Anthony Regan, “Constitution-making and Reform: Options for 
the Process” (New York: Interpeace, 2011) pp 13–33; Yash Ghai, “The Constitution Reform 
Process: Comparative Perspectives”, unpublished paper for conference “Toward Inclusive and 
Participatory Constitution Making”, Kathmandu, Nepal, August 2004; Maria Dakolias, “Are 
We There Yet?: Measuring Success of Constitutional Reform” (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1117, 1210–1215; Yash Ghai, “Civil Society, Participation and the Making of 
Kenya’s Constitution”, unpublished paper on file with the author, 2014.
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transparent, it would be more likely that they would accept the outcome 
from that process.7
Two reasons may explain why the 2013–2015 reform process went 
unquestioned. First, it was more or less the same process followed by the 
Hong Kong government the two previous times when political reform 
was attempted, respectively 2004–2005 and 2007–2010.8 But those 
exercises were concerned with only incremental political reform, not the 
ultimate aim of universal suffrage. Given the significance of a universal 
suffrage reform exercise, one of great interest to everyone in the special 
administrative region and likely to attract a wide range of opinions, 
there were good grounds to modify the existing process to include more 
meaningful opportunities for public input.
The second reason is the belief that the NPCSC’s 2004 interpretation, 
setting down a five-step procedure for political reform, does not allow 
for any other process than the one followed in the past.9 But the five-
step procedure only refers to the sequence of necessary decisions to be 
made by the relevant three parties: the chief executive, legislators and 
NPCSC. It neither prescribes nor precludes the adoption of participatory 
processes and bodies to inform the decision-making at the different steps. 
Indeed the Hong Kong government’s three-person task force conducted 
consultations before the first step of the chief executive’s report and 
before the vote by legislators at the third step.10 But the question remains 
whether more should have been done to receive meaningful input from 
the public.
In this critical assessment of the 2013–2015 process, one starts by 
reflecting on the roles played by the Hong Kong government’s task 
force, the NPCSC, the chief executive and the LegCo in the context of 
constitutional change under the Basic Law. The task force was intended 
to serve as a kind of constitutional commission that develops initial 
reform proposals, consults the public on those proposals, and refines 
those proposals in the light of the consultation results.11 According to 
the amendment formula in Annex I of the Basic Law, there is no single 
representative constituent assembly that considers and decides on the 
7 Interpeace, ibid., p 19.
8 LegCo Secretariat, “Constitutional Development”, updated background brief for the 
special  meeting of the Panel on Constitutional Affairs, 9 December 2013, LC Paper No 
CB(2)451/13-14(02).
9 The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of Article 7 of 
Annex I and Article III of Annex II of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China, 8th Session, 10th National People’s Congress, 
6 April 2004.
10 See generally “P/R and Other News”, available at www.2017.gov.hk.
11 On the distinct roles of constitutional commissions and constituent assemblies, see Interpeace 
(n 6 above), pp 28–29; Yash Ghai (n 6 above), pp 4–7.
HKLJ-45(2)-01.Rethinking the process-Comment-Simon Young-SY.indd   383 8/18/15   3:17 PM
384 Simon NM Young (2015) HKLJ
constitutional commission’s reform proposals. The role is bifurcated 
between the NPCSC and the LegCo. The chief executive has a unique 
role. His views and efforts are reflected in the work of the task force, 
though he is not formally a member. In addition, as a result of this 
bifurcation, the chief executive’s consent in the amendment process and 
his dual accountability under Art 43 of the Basic Law, he must serve an 
important bridging role to bring the deliberations of the NPCSC and the 
LegCo into closer alignment.
Given the important role played by the task force, it is unsatisfactory 
that its membership included only three senior officials and no 
independent members. Independent experts could have enriched the 
knowledge base of the task force on matters including the conduct of 
public consultations, the analysis of and reporting on consultation 
results, the design of nomination methods, the design of a representative 
nominating committee and universal suffrage election methods.12 Wide 
public consultations are no substitute for inclusive and independent 
membership in the constitutional commission. Independents can 
contribute expertise and transparency to the process and promote public 
confidence in the end result.13 This has been the experience with having 
overseas non-permanent judges sitting in the Court of Final Appeal, a 
court now of international repute, whose judgments are cited throughout 
the common law world.14
The task force published a separate consultation document before 
and after the NPCSC’s 31 August decision and conducted public 
consultations, respectively, from 4 December 2013 to 3 May 2014 (five 
months) and from 7 January 2015 to 6 March 2015 (two months).15 The 
two documents sought views on a wide range of technical questions of 
design without expressing any preferred view. Two anomalies become 
apparent when these two documents are read in the context of the 
reform process. Given the substantial overlap in the lists of questions 
on which views were sought, it is unclear why the public was asked 
to express their views twice on the same design issues. Those who 
submitted a full submission in the first round would fail to see the 
point of a second submission, unless perhaps to modify one’s initial 
12 Interpeace, ibid., pp 17–18; Yash Ghai, ibid., pp 3, 5.
13 Yash Ghai, ibid., p 9.
14 Simon NM Young and Yash Ghai (eds), Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal: The Development of 
the Law in China’s Hong Kong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) chs 11, 22.
15 “Let’s Talk and Achieve Universal Suffrage: Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 
2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council in 2016 Consultation Document” (Hong Kong: 
HKSAR Government, December 2013); “2017 Seize the Opportunity: Method for Selecting 
the Chief Executive by Universal Suffrage Consultation Document” (Hong Kong: HKSAR 
Government, January 2015).
HKLJ-45(2)-01.Rethinking the process-Comment-Simon Young-SY.indd   384 8/18/15   3:17 PM
Vol 45 Part 2 Rethinking the Process of Political Reform in Hong Kong 385
view if it happened to be inconsistent with the NPCSC’s August 
decision. This leads to the second anomaly, which is the disconnect 
between the full range of questions asked in the first document and 
the chief executive’s report to the NPCSC. The main purpose of the 
chief executive’s report is to express a view on whether there is a need 
to amend the annexes of the Basic Law to attain the aim of universal 
suffrage of the chief executive and to progress the method of forming 
the legislature.16 Interestingly, the first consultation document never 
directly asked the public if they believed there was a need to amend 
the annexes, though the answer might be inferable from responses to 
the individual design questions. But, for the purposes of preparing the 
chief executive’s report, it was unnecessary to consult on such a wide 
range of technical design issues, especially if a second consultation was 
anticipated. Having the premature public debate on design details may 
well have contributed to the NPCSC’s strong reaction to calls for civil 
nominations. A possible explanation for these anomalies is that when 
the first consultation began, the government did not fully anticipate 
how the reform process would unfold and the need for and scope of a 
second consultation.
One judicial review application makes reference to a further disconnect 
between the chief executive’s report and the NPCSC’s August decision.17 
From the two previous reform attempts in 2005 and 2010, it is known that 
when the NPCSC decides affirmatively that there is a need to amend the 
annexes, it will also impose conditions that limit the changes to be made. 
However, it is never known in advance what those conditions (or even 
category of conditions) might be. The first consultation document did not 
specifically address what conditions should be imposed by the NPCSC, 
nor did the chief executive’s report recommend any specific conditions. 
This is another unsatisfactory aspect of the current procedures. It was 
the restrictive conditions contained in the August decision that surprised 
many, including those in the pro-establishment camp, and triggered the 
Occupy Central protests. The process failed to manage expectations and 
defuse conflict.
It comes back to the value of having meaningful input at important 
moments. Neither of the two consultations sought views on draft 
reform proposals. Since the NPCSC’s decision had the effect of severely 
16 Report by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress on whether there is a need to amend the methods 
for selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2017 and 
for forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2016 
(Hong Kong: HKSAR Government, July 2014).
17 Leung Lai Kwok Yvonne v Chief Secretary for Administration (HCAL 31/2015, [2015] HKEC 
1034), [28].
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narrowing the options for reform, it was necessary to consult the 
Hong Kong public before the decision was finalised. This did not happen 
as the chief executive’s report was submitted on 15 July 2014 and the 
NPCSC discussed the report only in the last week of August.18 LegCo’s 
constitutional affairs panel discussed the chief executive’s report, but not 
a draft NPCSC decision, on 21 July 2014.19
The NPCSC had a short period of time to consider and debate 
the draft August decision. However, this body of 150 lawmakers from 
across China had only one Hong Kong member, Ms Rita Fan.20 There 
is no formal requirement to consult the Basic Law Committee, which 
has six Hong Kong members; this is an anomaly since interpretations 
(Art 158) and amendments (Art 159) of the Basic Law require 
such consultations and the August decision necessarily involved an 
interpretation of Art  45.21 Forming part of the constituent assembly 
that makes decisions on the political future of Hong Kong, the NPCSC 
should have greater Hong Kong representation in its membership and 
a better means of receiving input from the Hong Kong public on its 
draft decisions.
Following the second consultation, the Hong Kong government 
released its consultation report and proposal on 22 April 2015.22 It 
was presented as a final proposal and, as is now known, without any 
possibility for compromise or negotiation. At this important moment 
when consultation was crucial, the process did not allow for it. Indeed 
in the less than two months leading up to the LegCo vote, it was 
entirely uncertain whether the pan-democrat legislators would ever 
enter into negotiations with either or both the Hong Kong and central 
governments. In the end, negotiations never took place, as both sides 
18 First media reports of an “extremely conservative framework” were from 12 August 2014, see 
“HK May Get Universal Suffrage in 2027” RTHK (12 August 2014).
19 LegCo Secretariat, “Minutes of Meeting Held on Monday” (LC Paper No CB(2)62/14-15, 
Panel on Constitutional Affairs, 21 July 2014).
20 Kiki Liu, “HK Legislator Rita Fan: Hong Kong Executive Chief Must Be Reliable” All-China 
Women’s Federation (27 October 2014), available at www.womenofchina.cn; Tommy Cheung, 
“NPC Standing Committee Starts Meeting on Hong Kong Reforms” South China Morning Post 
(25 August 2014).
21 Mr Li Fei’s explanation to the draft decision indicates, however, that the views of the Hong 
Kong deputies to the National People’s Congress and Hong Kong members of both the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference and Basic Law Committee were sought. See Li Fei, 
“Explanations on the Draft Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the Legislative 
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2016”, 10th Session, 
12th National People’s Congress (27 August 2014) 2.
22 “2017 Make It Happen! Method for Selecting the Chief Executive by Universal Suffrage 
Consultation Report and Proposals” (Hong Kong: HKSAR Government, April 2015).
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were not prepared to make concessions.23 This contrasts with the 
events in 2010, when the then chief executive brokered negotiations 
at the last minute between Democratic Party legislators and the central 
government in order to realise a small breakthrough in political reform.24 
It also contrasts starkly with the process of drafting the Basic Law, which 
involved a 59-member drafting committee, a 180-member consultative 
committee, and two draft versions of the text published for public 
consultation.25 The drafting committee had procedures for structured 
discussions, negotiations and breaking deadlocks.26 In 2015, there was 
no mechanism for structured negotiations, nor was the chief executive 
seen trying to bridge the central government and Hong Kong legislators 
towards closer alignment.27
All future attempts to realise universal suffrage will learn from the 
mistakes made in the past. As argued here, process matters and considerable 
thought needs to be put into designing a more participatory process than 
the existing one.28 This design process must itself be participatory and 
addressed at the outset of any reform exercise. Getting buy-in from the 
relevant stakeholders on the process of reform will help to ensure that 
the process is followed and increase the likelihood that the outcome will 
be accepted.
One might ask why the central and Hong Kong governments would 
agree to relax their control over the process by introducing independent 
membership and more public consultations. The answer lies in the long-
term future of Hong Kong, beyond 2047. The Basic Law has no expiry 
date. The only reference to the 50-year period is in Art 5: “The socialist 
system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of 
life shall remain unchanged for 50 years”. This provision means only 
that the capitalist system and way of life may change after 2047, but 
23 Jeffie Lam and Tony Cheung, “Bid for Compromise on Hong Kong Electoral Reform Package 
Fails, Pan-democrats Warned on ‘loyalty’” South China Morning Post (1 June 2015); Gary 
Cheung, “Beijing Leaves No Room for Hong Kong’s Moderate Voices on Political Reform” 
South China Morning Post (29 June 2015).
24 Gang Wenzu, “CE Lays Out Conditions for Counter-proposal” China Daily (19 June 2010); 
Albert Chen, “An Unexpected Breakthrough in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Reform” (2010) 
40 HKLJ 259.
25 “The Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic 
of China (For Solicitation of Opinions)” (Hong Kong: Drafting Committee for the Basic Law, 
April 1988) pp 1–4.
26 On the deadlock-breaking mechanisms, see Interpeace (n 6 above), pp 27–28.
27 The list of government press releases and other news on the political reform website (www.2017.
gov.hk/en/news/index.html) makes no mention of any effort made by the chief executive to 
arrange negotiations between the legislators and the central government after the reform 
proposal was published on 22 April 2015.
28 Dakolias (n 6 above), pp 1211–1212.
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if the central government seeks to do so after 2047, it must be done in 
accordance with the rule of law. As with political reform, it is a problem 
of constitutional change, although involving the amendment power 
in Art 159. It would be most unwise to try to effect unilateral change 
via Art 159, as such a tactic would likely trigger much more than a 
79-day civil disobedience movement. Any change of such significance 
should come from Hong Kong, and on the terms of Art 159, this will 
require the consent of two-third of all LegCo members. Hopefully when 
that time comes, we will have established an effective and orderly 
participatory process suitable for bringing about constitutional change 
of such momentous importance.
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